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On October 16, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its opinion dismissing the Authors Guild’s copyright case against Google Inc.2  What does it all 
mean for librarians?
History of the Google Books case
Let’s make a quick trip through the history of this long-running 
litigation.  It all began in 2004 when Google announced the initiation 
of its “Google Print” project and its “Library Project” (now generally 
called “Google Books”).  A few months later in 2005, the Authors 
Guild, several individual authors, and various publishers filed a lawsuit 
in New York City against Google, seeking to enjoin the project from 
going forward.
As litigation sometimes does, the proceedings began to drag out as the 
parties filed various motions with the court and engaged in preliminary 
investigations (known as “discovery”).  The parties also began negoti-
ations over a possible settlement in 2006.  After extended discussions, 
the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement on October 28, 2008. 
Notice of the proposed settlement was widely circulated and produced 
hundreds of objections.  The parties then modified the proposal and, on 
November 13, 2009, filed a proposed Amended Settlement Agreement 
with the trial court.
After notice of the amended settlement was circulated in early 2010, 
another flood of objections was filed, including one from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice which alleged that, if the proposed settlement was 
adopted, substantial anticompetitive effects would result.  On March 
22, 2011, U.S. District Judge Chin rejected the amended settlement as 
not “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”
The parties went back to the drawing board but were unable to 
reach a settlement that was likely to pass muster with the court.  So 
the case resumed its litigation posture, and on May 31, 2012, Judge 
Chin certified a class of plaintiff-authors and allowed them to proceed 
to trial.3  But a little over a year later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit vacated the class certification and ordered Judge Chin 
to consider whether or not Google had a legitimate “fair use” defense. 
He did so, and on November 14, 2013, Judge Chin granted summary 
judgment to Google on its fair use defense. 
The Authors Guild filed an appeal which, almost two years later in 
October 2015, resulted in affirmance of the District Court’s judgment.
Where Are We Now that the Case is Over?
Is it actually over?  Plaintiffs could possibly file a petition for a writ 
of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, but the likelihood of the Court 
accepting the case for review — and actually reversing it — seems low.
But the truth of the matter is that, assuming the case is over, the 
legal result of the case is both extremely sweeping and at the same time 
extremely narrow.  While millions of individual books have been copied 
and made part of the Google Books project, all that the Second Circuit 
has approved are the narrow word search and “snippet” features of the 
project.  The court’s opinion is limited to this specific conduct, and 
there is no court authorization for Google to do anything more than that.
On a book-by-book basis, therefore, very little of the works are 
actually made available to users of the system.
A Reminder of what Google is doing
Google has made digital copies of millions of books that were 
submitted to it for that purpose by major libraries.  Over 20 million 
have been scanned since 2004 (at an average cost of $10 per book).  In 
turn, Google has established a publicly-available search function for 
the digital copies. 
Specifically, an Internet user can use this function to search — with-
out charge or advertising — to determine whether the book contains a 
specified word or term.  The result of the search is that the user can see 
“snippets” of text containing the searched-for terms. 
In addition, participating libraries (i.e., those that have made their 
books available to Google for scanning) are given a limited right to 
download and retain digital copies of the books that they submitted.
Google’s Search Function is Quite Limited
The search function in Google Books is quite limited.  Only the first 
usage of the searched-for term on a given page is displayed, for example. 
Overall for each book containing the search term, a maximum of three 
“snippets” containing the term are displayed.  (A snippet is a horizontal 
segment comprising ordinarily an eighth of a page highlighting the term.)
It appears that the Google Books system cannot be fooled into pro-
viding more quotations.  In particular, a researcher cannot increase the 
number of snippets revealed on the system simply by repeating the entry 
of the same search term or by entering searches from different computers.
Moreover, one snippet per page and one page out of ten containing 
the term are randomly “blacklisted” by Google and cannot be displayed. 
Further, no snippet views of certain books such as dictionaries, cook-
books, and short poems are permitted.
The Second Circuit’s Ruling
In analyzing “fair use,” the Court of Appeals applied the four-part 
statutory test contained in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 
That Act provides that in determining whether a use is “fair,” the factors 
to be considered must include:
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes;
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.
Focusing heavily on the first factor (i.e., the purpose and character 
of the use), the Court of Appeals upheld Google’s making of a digital 
copy to provide a search function as fair use because it is “transforma-
tive.”  It augments public knowledge by making available information 
about authors’ books.  By contrast, Google does not provide the public 
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with a substantial “substitute” for the substance of the matter protected 
by the authors’ copyrights in the original works.  The same is true, at 
least under present conditions, of Google’s provision of the “snippet” 
function.  The search tool permits a researcher to identify those books, 
out of millions, that do – as well as those that do not — use the terms 
selected by the researcher.
While Google is a for-profit entity, the court held that profit motivation 
does not in these circumstances justify denial of fair use.  In any event, 
Google does not charge for the search and snippet functions.  (Whether 
a court might view matters differently if Google were to attempt to mon-
etize these services by charging for them is a question for another day.)
Legal Precedent:  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
The Second Circuit devoted considerable attention to interpreting the 
Supreme Court’s 1994 decision on fair use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music.4  There, a music group called “2 Live Crew” recorded a parody 
of Roy Orbison’s 1964 hit “Pretty Woman” without obtaining a license. 
The rights holder had sued and lost before the District Court, but won 
a reversal before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The ap-
pellate court held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it 
presumptively unfair under Section 107.  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
however, and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the claim.  The Court 
held that a commercial parody may be fair use if it is “transformative.”
A Caveat Re: “Transformative”
Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Campbell, the Second 
Circuit held that Google’s use of the copied books was transformative. 
However, the court issued a strong caveat narrowing the reach of that 
defense.  Speaking for the court, Judge Pierre Leval (who is considered 
something of an expert on copyright law) stated:
“The word ‘transformative’ cannot be taken too literally as a 
sufficient key to understanding the elements of fair use. It is 
rather a suggestive symbol for a complex thought, and does not 
mean that any and all changes made to an author’s original text 
will necessarily support a finding of fair use.”
Derivative Works and “Transformations”
Last year, the Second Circuit had given narrow approval to libraries’ 
pooling of the digital copies of their books provided to them by Google 
after scanning.  Some 80 universities and libraries had submitted over 
ten million digitized books into the HathiTrust repository which permits 
patrons to search for files for particular terms (but does not provide 
snippets).  Patrons with print disabilities (such as blindness) are provided 
full-text access to the books. 
In its 2014 HathiTrust decision,5 the Second Circuit distinguished 
between “derivative works” (which are not entitled to a “fair use” de-
fense) and transformative works (which may be).  The court said that 
“[p]aradigmatic examples of derivative works include the translation 
of a novel into another language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie 
or play, or the recasting of a novel as an eBook or an audiobook.”  In 
Google Books, the court explained that, “[w]hile such changes can be 
described as transformations, they do not involve the kind of transfor-
mative purpose that favors a fair use finding.”
The Key to Google Books is the Limited  
Nature of Google’s Use
The court perceived that the specialized use by Google of the 
copyrighted work distinguished it from unfair and improper uses.  By 
asking solely whether the work contains a word of interest, Google’s 
search function in effect treats the book as a mere compilation of data 
rather than exploiting its expressive content.  The following quotes from 
HathiTrust and Google Books illustrate this perspective:
“[T]he result of a word search is different in purpose, character, 
expression, meaning, and message from the page (and the book) 
from which it is drawn.” — HathiTrust
“[T]he purpose of Google’s copying of the original copyrighted 
books is to make available significant information about those 
books.” — Google Books
This transformation is made greater by the “snippet” function, in the 
court’s view.  “Snippet view adds important value to the basic transfor-
mative search function.”
“Merely knowing that a term of interest appears in a book does not 
necessarily tell the searcher whether she needs to obtain the book, 
because it does not reveal whether the term is discussed in a man-
ner or context falling within the scope of the searcher’s interest.”
For Transformation, Google Needed to Copy the Whole Book
In order to achieve these transformative search functions, Google 
needed to copy the whole book.  But importantly, though Google in 
effect makes an unauthorized digital copy of the entire book, it does not 
reveal that digital copy to the public.  The amount and substantiality of 
what is made accessible to a public is very limited.
Google has constructed the snippet feature in a manner that sub-
stantially protects against its serving as a substitute for authors’ books. 
In the court’s words:
“Google safeguards from public view the digitized copies it 
makes and allows access only to the extent of permitting the pub-
lic to search for the very limited information accessible through 
the search function and snippet view.  The program does not allow 
access in any substantial way to a book’s expressive content.”
Recall that Google Tried to Get a Lot More than This.
The actual use made of the copyrighted works is far narrower than 
Google envisioned a decade ago.  Consider the failed 2009 amended 
settlement: it would have allowed Google to make substantially more 
extensive use of its scans of copyrighted books than the current arrange-
ment.  There, Google sought the right to:
(1)  sell subscriptions to an electronic books database;
(2)  sell online access to individual books; and
(3)  sell advertising on pages from books.
The amended settlement (if it had been approved) would have 
effectively granted Google a monopoly over digital books, and, in 
particular, orphan books.
But none of these uses exist in the current arrangement.
Libraries’ Use of Their Digitized Books is as  
Restricted as Google
Reading HathiTrust and Google Books together, it is clear that the 
participating libraries must use their digital copies to enable only the 
kinds of searches that the Second Circuit has held to be fair uses in 
connection with Google’s offer of such searches to the Internet public: 
i.e., word searches and snippets.
Libraries may not freely disseminate or allow patrons to access the 
full-text of digital copies and defend by claiming “fair use.”  (Only the 
narrow category of print-disabled patrons may have access to the full 
text of the digitized books.)
Can Libraries Be Liable for Copyright Infringement?
With respect to the digital copies that Google has created (and re-
turned to them), if libraries were to misuse them in an infringing manner, 
those libraries may be liable to authors for copyright infringement. 
Also, libraries might incur liability by negligent mishandling of, 
and failure to protect, their digital copies, leaving them unreasonably 
vulnerable to hacking.
A Musical Aside
All this suggests to me a Rodgers & Hart song from their 1940 
musical Pal Joey (which I have “transformed” for fair use purposes):
If they asked me, I could scan a book,
That you could read upon a Kindle or Nook.
You could search the preface inside and out
So you’d know what data’s about.
And the simple secret of the plot
Is just to limit what we disclose a lot.
Then the world discovers as our case ends
On what our fair use law depends.
continued on page 51
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Now it’s Your Turn to Talk …
It is important to hear from librarians about Google Books, be-
cause in the end, the essential question to be answered is whether the 
Google Books project has been worth all the effort to create it (and to 
fight about it).  So, I would like to know what you have to say on the 
following questions:
Is Google Books being used by libraries and library patrons in a 
productive (and proper way)?
Is the world (at least the library world) a better place for its creation?
Share your answers with the author at <whannay@schiffhardin.
com>.  
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Cases of Note — Register Your Copyright Without 
Delay
Column Editor:  Bruce Strauch  (The Citadel)  <strauchb@citadel.edu>
LA RESOLANA ARCHITECTS, PA. 
V. CLAY REALTORS ANGEL FIRE AND 
ANGEL FIRE HOME DESIGN.  UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
TENTH CIRCUIT.  416 F.3d 1195; 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 15319.
This is about that oddity of the author 
having copyright when the work is fixed in a 
tangible medium but having to register before 
suit can be brought.
La Resolana Architects met with Clay 
Realtors to discuss building townhouses at 
the famous Angel Fire, New Mexico ski resort. 
Architectural drawings were shown that were 
done specifically for the site, but no agreement 
was reached.  This was in 1996-97.
In 2003, an architect from La Resolana 
was at the site and noticed a very similar set 
of townhouses being sold by Clay.  Teeing up 
for a lawsuit, La Res applied to register their 
copyright, sent in apps, fees, etc. Before con-
firmation of the registration, La Res filed suit.
Clay moved for dismissal because La Res 
lacked a certificate of copyright registration. 
La Res replied all the stuff had been received, 
and copyright was approved for registration 
on Jan. 22, 2004.
Why do lawyers do these kind of delaying 
things?  Do they imagine the other side will 
get bored and go away?
The district court held for Clay.  And up 
we go to the Tenth Circuit.
So which is it?
Subject matter jurisdiction gives a court 
power to adjudicate a case.  The 1976 Copy-
right Act merged a confusing mix of state and 
federal law into a single and exclusive Federal 
system.  All state law was preempted.
Protection was made easier by granting it 
the moment an original idea “leaves the mind” 
and is put into a tangible medium.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists 
… in original works of authorship fixed in a 
tangible medium”).
“Application approach.”  The Registration 
approach can be found in Vacheron & Con-
stantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus 
Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640-41 (2d Cir. 
1958).  And there’s the nice “the exam-
ination would be meaningless if filing and 
registration were synonymous.”  Robinson 
v. Princeton Review, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16932.
But Mel Nimmer and various courts think 
application is sufficient.  After all, the owner 
can sue whether the application is rejected or 
not.  See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Copyright, Vol. 2 § 7.16[B][1][a], p. 7-154-56. 
See also, Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 
1108 (5th Cir. 1991).
They note that an infringer can run amok 
while the Copyright Office sifts through piles 
of applications.  The owner can sue and move 
towards a court date while waiting for the 
certificate.
And yet …
Do you really need a paper certificate to 
sue? The fact of registration can exist before 
the certificate goes out. And it’s the fact of 
registration that gives the court jurisdiction.
Nonetheless …
The Tenth Circuit sticks with the regis-
tration requirement.  The creative soul ought 
to get busy and register without waiting 
for someone to infringe. 
Plus you could 
have the odd 
circumstance 
of presumption 
of validity upon 
a p p l i c a t i o n , 
then have the 
certificate refused, and the presumption flips 
back.
And they affirm the dismissal of the com-
plaint.
And the billable hours go up for lawyers.  
Registration
Registration is simple.  Provide a copy 
of the work, an application and a fee.  The 
Register of Copyrights then checks the work 
to determine if it is copyrightable.  If it is, then 
“the Register shall register the claim and issue 
to the applicant a certificate of registration.”  17 
U.S.C. § 410(a).
But the protection is always there from that 
moment of tangible medium.  “[R]egistration 
is not a condition of copyright infringement.” 
17 U.S.C. § 408(a).  In fact, registering is 
entirely voluntary.
But if you want to sue …?
The big benefit of registering is you are 
allowed to sue in federal court for infringe-
ment. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).  And the certificate 
of registration serves as prima facie evidence 
of the copyright’s validity.
Now, about our case …
“[N]o action for infringement of the copy-
right … shall be instituted until preregistration 
or registration of the copyright claim has been 
made in accordance with this title.”
And even if the registration has been 
refused, you may still sue with a copy of the 
complaint served on the Register of Copy-
rights.  Id. 411(a).
The word “preregistration” was added in 
2005.  But this was not part of the 
statute when this action was filed.
Nothing in the language 
even suggests that receipt 
by the Copyright Office 
is sufficient.  Registration 
is not automatic.  It can be 
refused. You must have 
registration or refusal before filing suit.  And 
you’re trying to establish your prima facie 
case for copyright.
But despite the plain language …
Gosh darn it, the courts are divided be-
tween the “Registration approach” and the 
